Governing in and Against Austerity: International Lessons from Eight Cities by Davies, Jonathan S.
GOVERNING IN AND AGAINST 
AUSTERITY: INTERNATIONAL 
LESSONS FROM EIGHT CITIES
Professor Jonathan S. Davies 
Director - Centre for Urban Research on Austerity 
De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
GOVERNING IN AND AGAINST 
AUSTERITY: INTERNATIONAL 
LESSONS FROM EIGHT CITIES
CONTENTS
For decades, cities across the world have been 
grappling with budget squeezes, public service 
cuts and waves of institutional restructuring. For 
many, the 2008 financial crisis marked a new 
and intensified phase, for which former British 
Prime Minister David Cameron coined the term 
“age of austerity”. The research discussed in this 
report explores the myriad ways that the age of 
austerity is experienced, interpreted, governed 
and contested in cities, framed by longer-term 
crises of industrialism and the post-war welfare 
state. We conducted our study in eight very 
different cities: Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, 
Dublin, Leicester, Greater Dandenong 
(Melbourne), Montréal and Nantes. In each city, 
we spoke to a wide range of people including 
elected politicians, public officials, business 
leaders, voluntary and community organisations, 
services users, anti-austerity activists and trade 
unionists. In this report, we discuss key findings 
from each city. 
For some of our cities, a great deal has changed 
since we began – indeed our research has 
tracked important changes over time. Following 
the Brexit referendum in June 2016, the UK 
abandoned its paramount “age of austerity” goal 
of rapid deficit elimination (currently rescheduled 
for 2025). Yet, for British cities budget cuts and 
restructuring continue unabated. Although a 
badly weakened May government is wavering, 
the reality is that austerity goes on. The same 
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is true of Dublin, where a centralising austerity 
government faces newly vibrant anti-austerity 
movements. Greece mounted a national 
popular struggle against austerity centred on 
Athens, only for the anti-austerity government 
to capitulate in 2015, when confronted with the 
prospect of leaving the Euro. After decades of 
racially inflected austerity, and the 2015 revolt 
against police violence, Baltimore now has to 
contend with Donald Trump’s overt hostility to 
“sanctuary” cities. Yet Spain has witnessed a 
renaissance in urban politics, with anti-austerity 
platforms governing four of its five largest cities, 
including our case study of Barcelona. Here, 
the talk is of a “new municipalism”, linked to 
the radicalisation of participatory democracy. 
Nantes too seeks to radicalise participatory 
governance, but in the very different context 
of an energetically entrepreneurial governing 
strategy. With its own politics fragmented, 
Montréal has to navigate a multi-tier system in 
which the Federal government now professes 
to have rejected austerity, while the province of 
Quebec remains committed to it. Australia’s one 
attempt to pass a full-blooded austerity budget 
under former PM Tony Abbott came to nothing, 
but our case study city of Greater Dandenong 
nevertheless operates in a fiscally conservative 
environment, with a variety of crises seen to 
be looming on the horizon as revenues fall and 
demands on budgets increase.
1
Diverse as they are, the case studies focus 
on a common problem: who defines, governs 
and resists austerity, its variants and cross-
currents? How do they do it, through what kinds 
of alliances between governmental and non-
governmental actors? Are collaborative forms 
of governance between government, citizens 
and civil society viable in conditions of austerity, 
or is this something only for “good times”? 
What potential do we see, despite austerity, 
for just and emancipated cities? The following 
vignettes capture some of the answers emerging 
in response to these questions. How cities 
respond will be crucial in shaping the future for 
all of us. 
Our purpose in this report is to capture the 
urban experience internationally, in order to 
provoke dialogue and exchange through which 
local people can learn from what is happening 
in different places. These are the challenges, 
opportunities and threats – for good or ill – 
revealed through juxtaposition and comparison. 
To this end, the report supports a series of 
workshops in our eight cities over the next few 
months, designed to facilitate exchange and 
learning. We will report the outcomes from  
these exchanges on the CURA website at  
http://cura.our.dmu.ac.uk, and on our twitter 
feed @cura2015. We hope participants find  
the report and key messages useful, especially 
as a way of encouraging international dialogue 
and learning. 
Key messages 
1.   The 2008 crisis hit cities very unevenly,  
even those at the European epicentre. Not  
all recognise the language of “austerity”  
as applicable. 
2.   As might be expected, austerity cuts, welfare 
reforms and housing foreclosures hit the 
worst-off hardest of all. In some cases, 
austerity hits the middle classes too. 
3.   What happens in cities matters. Cities 
affected by crisis and austerity respond in 
varied ways. Urban histories, economies, 
traditions, struggles, conflicts and 
geographies make a big difference to 
austerity politics. 
4.   Forms of collaborative governance vary 
widely on a continuum from those concerned 
with radicalising participatory democracy to 
those preoccupied mainly with managing 
austerity and maintaining state control. 
5.   For several locally distinctive reasons 
including political centralisation, social 
alienation/public disaffection, institutional 
instability and organised resistance, austerity 
weakens the prospect for building strong, 
inclusive and equitable social partnerships 
between governments and citizens. 
6.   Austerity cuts are damaging to grant-
dependent local voluntary and community 
groups. This finding reveals an austerity 
paradox.  Governments demand greater 
levels of citizen activism, while making it 
harder to achieve.
7.   At the same time, austerity concentrates 
government resources in large third sector 
organisations, with little connection to  
locality. The capacity of these larger 
organisations to campaign and influence 
policy is itself reduced. 
8.   Austerity governance therefore tends to 
be either hierarchical and state-centred, 
or rooted in “elite” partnerships involving 
governments, business leaders and NGOs. 
9.   Branding and place marketing is central 
to urban growth strategies for coping with 
and moving beyond austerity. Some cities 
selectively integrate cultural and ethnic 
diversity into their branding.
10.  However, growth alone cannot compensate 
for austerity. There is an ever-present tension 
between the realities of urban development 
and the idea of a socially just, inclusive city. 
11.  Cities cannot avoid fallout from international 
crises and national austerity measures, but 
some do adopt strategies that diverge from 
those of regional and national governments. 
12.  Crucially, there can be political alternatives 
to austerity, even in cities severely affected 
by spending cuts and fiscal centralisation. 
13.  Resistance to austerity is very uneven. Given 
a felicitous alliance between electoral and 
grass-roots anti-austerity forces, a “new 
municipalism” is possible. However, the 
attempt to challenge austerity at the city 
level encounters hostility from national and 
regional governments, as well as corporate 
and media forces.
14.  Linking opposition movements and building 
alliances between cities, social movements, 
workplace and community organisations 
capable of challenging higher tiers of 
government will therefore be crucial, if  
anti-austerity forces are to succeed.
We are exceptionally grateful to the British 
Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) for funding our study (award number 
ES/L012898/1). Finally, we are indebted to 
more than 300 people, who gave up time to 
participate in the study.  Research is wholly 
dependent on volunteers. We are immensely 
grateful to all of them. 
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ATHENS:  
THE CENTRE OF EUROPEAN AUSTERITY
The City of Athens is one of 66 municipalities 
in the Attica region of Greece, with a central 
population of approximately 660,000 and 
metropolitan population of some 3.9 million. 
The City Council is controlled by a pro-austerity 
centre-left coalition, with the city mayor also 
backed in the elections by the conservatives. 
The Mayor is the key figure in the Council, 
setting municipal policies with a relatively  
free hand.
Among all European cities, it is in Athens that 
austerity bites hardest. The global financial crisis 
of 2008, and economic depression that followed 
had a devastating impact on Athens, leading to 
population decline. The numbers of homeless 
in the Athens metropolitan area rose to an 
estimated at 9.100, while the Region of Attica 
recorded the largest fall in household disposable 
incomes anywhere in the EU. Municipal 
indicators show that a total of 26.1% of the 
population subsist at income levels below the 
poverty threshold and a further 8.1% experience 
severe material deprivation. 
The city centre is the fulcrum of the crisis. The 
majority of street work with the homeless in the 
region is taking place in the centre, with the 
most powerful anti-austerity protests occurring 
in the same places. This juxtaposition makes 
the city centre the focal point of both the human 
crisis of austerity and the multiple forms of 
resistance to it.
Budget cuts severely undermine 
municipal governing capacities
In the aftermath of the 2008 events, and to 
avoid a solvency crisis, the government agreed a 
series of loans with the European Commission, 
the European Central Bank and the IMF. The 
austerity-centered fiscal adjustment logic that 
followed the loans, triggered a seven year 
long and ongoing recession, during which the 
economy lost a cumulative 27 per cent of its 
GDP. Athens was disproportionately affected 
by the crisis, and it has been disproportionately 
affected by years of austerity too. Between 
2010-2017, the municipal budget has been 
slashed by over 20 per cent due to cuts in 
national government grants and a significant 
fall in tax revenues. As a public official put it, 
“we had 12.000 employees and now we have 
7.000. […] What do you do in such a case? 
Do you shut the municipality down? You have 
to react, for sure, but within a framework”.
In response, the municipality of Athens began to 
re-organize municipal administrative structures 
and services in an attempt to cut costs. The 
application of strict cost and revenue controls 
is visible in the City’s debt elimination scheme, 
expected to settle almost all municipal liabilities 
by 2019 via steadily increasing budget 
surpluses and new sources of income. As 
municipal fiscal responses go over and above 
bailout conditions for balanced budgets and 
limited debt exposure, austerity in the case of 
Athens is, to some extent, a political choice. 
Historically, the governance of Athens has 
been very state-centred, and partnership 
governance weak. As we explain below, this 
approach has changed significantly under 
austerity, as the city opened up to the influence 
of corporate and elite third sector organisations.
Under Austerity, Athens is governed 
through a new form of Elite Pluralism
Under austerity, Athens has sought to 
develop new partnerships, particularly in 
urban regeneration, economic development 
and social policy. These processes feature 
transnational organisations, major corporations 
and NGOs as key partners, reflecting the rising 
prominence of “philanthrocapitalism” in the 
city. For example, the ‘Solidarity Hub’, the most 
prominent municipal social policy scheme, is 
a venture with an NGO called Solidarity Now, 
established in 2013 by George Soros’s Open 
Society Foundations (OSF). Similarly, Samsung 
funds ‘Innovathens’, a municipal economic 
development initiative in the tech sector. This 
mode of governance has even influenced the 
way the City plans for its future. Athens bid 
successfully for participation in the 100 Resilient 
Cities (100RC) global network - sponsored 
by Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors - in an 
attempt to gain access to experts and resources 
to address the crisis. Thus, the “collaborative 
turn” in Athens occurs mainly among a limited 
range of “elite” corporate and NGO partners. 
The new austerity governance in Athens is best 
understood as a form of “elite pluralism”.
Collaborating with NGOs in this way is seen as 
a pragmatic way to ameliorate social deprivation. 
According to local politicians, the City Council 
is now the institution of last resort, obliged 
to respond only when everything else fails. A 
councillor commented, “they moan because 
we work with NGOs. Ok, find us another 
way. It’s not the memorandum or austerity; 
it’s necessity that drives us. […] We made a 
choice! The municipality of Athens is taking 
care of 20.000 people. You can’t just ignore 
that, or let it go by. […] If someone says I 
won’t do it because that’s not the right way 
forward, well he/she is taking a risk, we don’t”.
This context of elite pluralism, combined with 
EU and nationally mandated austerity, means 
that the capacity of the municipality to develop 
a policy framework reflecting local interests 
is severely constrained. It is conditional on 
the extent to which local goals coincide 
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“During the last three years [2013-2016], 
grassroots initiatives in Athens more 
than doubled …. These are groups that 
operate informally on principle, and only 
a few turn into NGOs. They don’t want to 
have any dealings with the state or with 
handling funds. They just want to offer a 
way out to the crisis” (VSO respondent).
The sheer diversity of goals and practices that 
characterize Athenian grassroots initiatives 
- from social medical centres and alternative 
currencies to social cooperative enterprises 
and community kitchens - makes classification 
a futile exercise. Still, we find common traits, 
notably informality and antipathy to formal 
structures and institutions associated with 
austerity. Even groups that acquired a legal form 
to participate in fundraising bids operate along 
self-organised and voluntary lines. Informality 
made sustainable by social media and the 
presence of dedicated web platforms, such as 
“volunteer4Greece” and “solidarity4all”, which 
communicate grassroots activities and needs 
to an increasingly receptive public. Moreover, 
‘volunteerism’ complements ‘informality’ as a 
key trait of grassroots’ mobilization, shaping 
a rebellious political stance that feeds on 
ever-growing marginalization from formal 
structures and institutions. According to 
a local activist, “volunteerism is a form of 
resistance. It’s a statement, exposing the 
absence of the authorities from where they 
are needed; it’s a way to show and deal 
with the problems the city is facing”.
However, it is important to note that this 
dynamic associational realm has not developed 
the kind of synergies necessary to mount a 
counter-offensive against austerity. Athenian 
social solidarity networks are predominantly 
small-scale schemes, run by a few people 
with all their energies focused on managing 
the human crisis. Such traits impede the 
renewal of confrontational and transformative 
politics through this network. As one volunteer 
put it, “…when the ‘what can we do’ issue 
comes up, the answer is ‘small things, small 
acts’, and the reason is a very pragmatic 
one. We don’t have the time and the energy 
for anything more; we try so hard on a 
daily basis to simply make ends meet”. 
Anti-austerity networks reject 
collaboration with the state and NGOs
Informality is one common trait among these 
anti-austerity networks; rejecting communication 
and cooperation with the authorities is a 
second. Unlike traditional struggles, for 
example those connected to formal politics 
through the Communist Party, these activist 
networks studiously avoid agents, practices 
and institutions associated with austerity, even 
the less radical elements. As a respondent 
from the network observed, “there’s this 
growing realization that we’re on our own, 
under no protective umbrella of any formal 
authority or institution. Not only that, but that 
we’re actually against them. Hence the shift 
towards self-organisation. […] The election 
of SYRIZA and the great disappointment 
that followed it, shattered any remaining 
illusions that there’s a chance for a way out via 
formal politics and institutions”. Not a single 
grassroots’ group or network is participating 
in any municipal collaborative arrangement, 
despite attempts by the City to reach out to the 
informal associational realm (see synAthina). 
with the priorities of state funding bodies 
and philanthropies – a common feature of 
collaboration elsewhere in Europe and the USA. 
In Athens, the rise of elite networks involving 
city and NGOs has been neither progressive 
nor democratic. This mode of governing 
is forcefully rejected at the grass roots.
Athens has witnessed an 
explosion of Informal Grass Roots 
Organisations against Austerity
Athens’ compliance with austerity has spawned 
new forms of resistance. The city was the 
focal point of mass anti-austerity struggles in 
Europe for several years after 2010, centered 
on the organizing power of the trade unions 
and the political dynamism of Syriza, then an 
upcoming opposition party of the radical left. 
However, this antagonistic movement has 
lost much – though not all - of its momentum. 
Trade unions were deeply affected by 
austerity as high unemployment reduced their 
membership and undermined their organizing 
capacity. As commented by a trade unionist, 
“during the last years we organized more 
than 40 general strikes and … I personally 
think that because of the crisis, unionism 
suffered a strategic defeat; we couldn’t offer 
an alternative to austerity, a way out”. 
Disillusionment prevailed when Syriza took 
office and the new government adopted 
austerity in July 2015. Since then, new solidarity 
networks have asserted themselves in the 
social and political landscape. More than 2.500 
grassroots schemes have emerged in Greek 
cities, signifying the rise of a diffuse network 
that has a prominent presence in Athens. 
The 2015 national referendum made an already 
difficult relationship worse. Voters were asked 
on whether to approve of the austerity-laden 
bailout conditions jointly proposed by the 
country’s creditors. The Mayor’s leading role in 
the national campaign to accept EU demands 
broke any remaining links. According to a 
community activist, “the referendum wasn’t 
about the Euro or Grexit. It was about austerity. 
You can’t stand out as the main proponent of 
the ‘yes’ vote, as the mayor did, knowing that 
what we stand for is negated by the ‘yes’ vote”.
In summary, seven years of austerity have 
demolished bridges between the local state 
and citizen activists. In this situation, there can 
be no meaningful social partnership to govern 
austerity. Austerity has rather spawned new 
elite networks, into which activists cannot be 
absorbed. In Athens, civil society is increasingly 
bifurcated: on one hand global NGOs in 
partnership with the city and state, on the 
other grass-roots organisations refusing to 
cooperate – but with little organizing capability. 
So far, unlike Barcelona, however, these 
grassroots forces have not crystallized into a 
city-level or national movement, or made links 
with more traditional – though increasingly 
episodic - forms of organised struggle. 
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Baltimore’s population of 615,000 has declined 
by more than a third from its 1950 peak 
of 950,000. Household median income is 
$41,000, compared to $74,000 for Maryland. 
As of 2015, nearly a quarter of the city’s 
residents fall below the federal poverty level. 
Those in receipt of Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (‘food stamp’) benefits 
doubled from 11,000 in 2006 to nearly 22,000 
in 2013. At the beginning of 2008, Baltimore’s 
unemployment rate was 5.6%, rising to a post-
crisis peak of 11.4% at the start of 2011, which 
by January 2017 had fallen back to 6.5%. The 
city is economically and socially isolated from 
its wealthier neighbouring counties in the Metro 
Baltimore region, population 2.7m. The region 
is on the upswing economically, but stability 
and prosperity are distributed highly unequally 
across spatial, racial and community lines. 
The city’s racial composition is 64% African 
American, 32% White and 6% Hispanic/ Latin/ 
Asian. Baltimore is a longstanding Democratic 
Party stronghold. Since election of its first 
African American Mayor (Kurt Schmoke, in office 
1987-99) all Mayors except Martin O’Malley 
have been black women. Since the presidential 
election of November 2016, both the outgoing 
and current city mayors have affirmed Baltimore 
as a ‘welcoming city’ for immigrants and 
refugees, facing down Donald Trump’s threats 
to withhold federal funds from ‘sanctuary 
cities’. However, despite this progressive gloss, 
Baltimore is deeply polarised along class and 
racial lines, uniquely so among our cities. 
BALTIMORE:  
AN INIQUITOUS “TWIN TRACK” CITY
As one interviewee explained, “inequality 
in Baltimore is so much grosser than it is 
in the nation as a whole… and it’s cut on 
racial lines, which makes it all the more 
obvious and all the more oppressive’. 
Baltimore has been in the grip 
of “Austerity” for Decades
As the preceding employment indicators show, 
Baltimore was hit hard by the 2008 crisis. 
However, the fiscal squeeze started long before 
the latest crisis, and has continued unabated. 
As one respondent commented, Baltimore “is 
used to austerity and functions like that all the 
time” The enduring ‘fiscal squeeze’, resulting 
from a shrinking tax base, declining state and 
federal grants, and increasing service needs 
is interpreted simply as a “harsh reality”. One 
respondent captured the nature of Baltimore’s 
structural crisis in the following terms: 
“We don’t have an economy to support our 
citizens. We have a tremendous amount of 
racism institutionally in how we’ve been planned 
as a city, how our institutions function as a city, 
and the lack of resources and leadership to 
really do some reconciliation that’s necessary, 
but then also address the 50 plus years of 
delayed investment in, not only neighbourhoods, 
but institutions of our government and our 
schools. And we have a huge human capital 
problem starting from birth on, and very few 
pathways for the majority of residents to 
really access any opportunity, whether it be 
schools or health or decent housing - and 
obviously, they’re all interconnected”. 
 
The ‘Triage’ Investment System: Investors 
prioritise some neighbourhoods, 
while abandoning others
The City’s approach to decades of fiscal 
squeeze has been to try and increase revenues 
and reduce public spending, as well as 
seeking to partner with local ‘ed and med’ 
institutions and philanthropies to integrate 
development and spending priorities. This 
approach has led to a highly selective focus 
on economic development, centred on 
the growth needs of ‘anchor’ institutions – 
major local employers, like Johns Hopkins 
University, that are strongly rooted in the city. 
The primary goal is to de-concentrate 
poverty through attracting and retaining the 
middle class to live in the city (gentrification) 
combined with relocation (dispersal) and social 
mobility initiatives for the poor (economic 
inclusion). Investment decisions are based on 
a “triage” system, prioritising neighbourhoods 
deemed to have some existing potential for 
development, while de-prioritising the most 
distressed and the most prosperous areas. 
The most deprived neighbourhoods not 
perceived to be economically viable, usually 
with majority African American populations, are 
‘written off’ and ‘contained’, thus intensifying 
class and racial polarisation. In this context, 
participatory mechanisms for grassroots 
organisations and citizens, such as negotiating 
the terms of relocation or community benefits 
agreements, have been scarce and tokenistic. 
More recently, economic inclusion strategies 
seeking to harness local benefits from meeting 
anchors’ employment and procurement 
needs are being rolled out across the city. 
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Baltimore is Governed 
Opportunistically by Elites
Baltimore is highly unusual by traditional 
European standards - both in terms of 
the opportunistic way in which policy is 
determined, and in terms of the elites that 
wield governing power, comprising the City 
Mayor and key officials, along with the city’s 
anchors and philanthropies. The city is a 
longstanding example of the “elite pluralist” 
arrangement now emerging in Athens. 
This form of governance has created a stark 
schism between Baltimore’s mostly white-led 
non-profit sector and its activist community, 
who spoke of the city’s ‘non-profit industrial 
complex’. A government official accepted 
that the ‘whole infrastructure here of non-
profits and others… co-opt community voice 
and say, this is what the community wants’. 
Longstanding activist and advocacy efforts have 
been augmented by new social movements 
and issue-based activism. Their primary focus 
is not the fiscal squeeze, as such, but rather 
the manifestation of injustice in the form of 
police violence and economic marginalisation.
Baltimore’s uprising: A Renewed 
Demand for Social Justice 
In April 2015, Baltimore’s uprising, which 
made global headlines, occurred after the 
death following injuries sustained whilst in 
police custody of a young black man, Freddie 
Gray. All those interviewed acknowledged 
the uprising as an outcry against the city’s 
inequities, and saw it as heightening the need 
for a more authentically inclusive form of 
governance. Some suggested that elites have 
started to work more collaboratively as a result: 
“businesses and philanthropic organisations 
and the institutions are really stepping forward 
and saying we’ve got to do more collectively’. 
Others were more cautious: “it’s going to take 
courage… because these are systematic, 
inequitable things that are so entrenched in 
this city that we really have to blow this thing 
up and do it the right way”. However, it seems 
that any impetus for social justice may already 
be diminishing in the ebb-tides of the uprising.
 
From the Rhetoric of Change 
to Business as Usual?. 
It is clear that while there has been some 
adjustment in style and tone, the goals and fixes 
pursued in the city remain largely the same. One 
interviewee cautioned that ‘economic inclusion’ 
initiatives are “taking the pie and cutting out 
a slice for the groups that aren’t benefitting 
- it’s not pulling them in”. These initiatives 
contrast with “community wealth-building” and 
ownership programmes, advocated by more 
radical activist groups. This was presented as 
a “parallel structure, a parallel narrative… [a] 
vision of community empowerment from the 
grassroots up, as opposed to seeing black 
folks as appendages of a neoliberal wave”. 
However, many activists do not regard city 
government as being capable of providing the 
necessary leadership. Their scepticism seems 
reasonable, though there was some recognition 
of efforts ‘to educate residents around the 
role of city government today, that it is not 
everything’. City budget workshops were cited 
as ‘an example of at least having community 
engagement that our police officers don’t do’. 
Our activist respondents talked a lot about a 
“twin-track” mode of governance in Baltimore, 
illustrated by the contrasting experiences of the 
Port Covington and Sandtown neighbourhoods. 
Port Covington, the city’s current waterfront 
megaproject, has approvals for $660 million of 
tax increment financing, the biggest financing 
package in Baltimore’s history. Redevelopment 
of this 80 hectare area of former rail-yards and 
industrial land is envisaged as creating ‘a city 
within a city’ of homes, offices, retail space and 
parkland, housing 10-15,000 new residents. In 
contrast, Sandtown in West Baltimore, one of 
the city’s most stressed neighbourhoods and 
the locus of the April 2015 uprising, now forms 
an initial focus for Project CORE, the State and 
City’s demolition and redevelopment initiative 
which removed 400 blighted properties in 2016. 
Some saw this approach as common sense, 
“when you allow that much disinvestment, 
there’s no other choice but to take it down”, 
and as presenting new opportunities, such as 
for greening the city. Others saw it as business 
as usual, “insensitive of our community... not 
even considering the issues that gave us 
blocks and blocks of blighted properties… a 
slow gentrification process”. The riots have 
led to a change in tone, but what else? As one 
interviewee commented, “the conversation may 
have changed but the systems aren’t changing”
What’s Next? Local Action and 
Police Reform are Crucial
Yet, most respondents found reasons to be 
hopeful about the city’s future, though opinions 
diverge about the way forward. Some stressed 
the need for consensus, “ways of partnering 
in a positive manner”. Others, embedded in 
the politics of resistance, stressed the need 
for a more adversarial approach oriented 
to thoroughgoing transformational change. 
The voice of black, young activists “trained 
outside of the local non-profit formula” has 
clearly become stronger since the uprising. 
The strength of local action will therefore be 
a key determinant of what happens next. 
Unsurprisingly, addressing the policing crisis 
was seen as a prerequisite for other progressive 
changes in the city, as one interviewee 
explained: “Police-community relations… 
I think everything else is so minor… that 
developer developing Port Covington don’t 
have absolutely nothing to do with my day-to-
day existence… But I’m getting those kinds of 
conversations in my life all the time now - so 
and so got shot the other day… Why would 
anybody think those kinds of conversations in 
America are acceptable? They have become the 
norm and I don’t want them to be the norm”.
The divided city of Baltimore is extreme by 
the standards of our other cities – even 
Athens. Ultimately, the research points to the 
critical need first to disclose and recognise 
the iniquitous divisions afflicting the city, and 
then find equitable pathways to reconciliation. 
Escaping the relentless fiscal squeeze, and 
the violence and destitution associated with 
it, would be an enormous step forward. 
The city is at a crucial tipping point.
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THE RETURN OF THE LEFT:  
BARCELONA AND THE NEW MUNICIPALISM
accelerated a long and deep decline of PSC, 
evident since the 1990s. In 1991, the PSC 
won 21 of 41 seats on the City Council and 
42.95% of the total vote. By 2011, its share 
had declined to 22.14% and 11 seats, losing 
power for the first time since the foundational 
post-Franco democratic elections in 1979. In 
2015, the PSC experienced a further dramatic 
collapse, winning only 9.63% of the vote and 4 
seats, finishing in fourth place. In its place, the 
radical left has seen a dramatic revival, through 
the Barcelona en Comú coalition (BeC). 
 
A New Chapter: The Indignados 
and the Rise of the New Left 
The eruption of the Indignados movement 
(also known as the 15M movement) in 
the spring of 2011 began a process of 
resurgence and re-articulation of the left in 
the city culminating in the electoral victory 
of Barcelona en Comú in the elections of 
May 2015 and signalling the dawn of what 
some people call “the new municipalism”. 
Barcelona en Comú is a radical left political 
platform born in 2014 from a variety of old 
and new social movements and political 
organisations. Ada Colau, the former leader 
of the anti-housing eviction movement, is 
the charismatic leader of this coalition and 
the current City Mayor of Barcelona. In the 
elections of 2015, BeC obtained 25,1% 
of total votes, wining in 53 out of the 73 
neighbourhoods of the city, and achieving 
particularly good results in the lowest-
income districts. Four of Spain’s five biggest 
cities are now governed by anti-austerity 
coalitions, including Madrid, with a significant 
influence on the tone of national politics.
Lessons from Barcelona: There 
is an alternative to Austerity!
The emergence of Barcelona en Comú reflects 
both the intensity and the depth of the crisis 
affecting the whole of Spain, and the strength 
of progressive social movements and political 
organisations rooted in urban life. We found 
a widespread consensus that the 2008 crisis 
differs from previous crises, because of its 
depth and its multi-dimensional character. 
“This crisis, as it seems to me, marks a 
‘before and after’ for many people, in their 
perception of the economic system in which 
we live and of the democratic system, the 
politics that we have lived” (Journalist)
The crisis has generated three main types 
of political response in Spain: conservatism 
- a pro-establishment stance led by the old 
conservative and social democratic parties; 
separatism – the huge Catalan independence 
movement; and the radical left, rooted in 
the municipalist tradition, and reinforced by 
the impetus of the Indignados movement 
and related mobilisations against housing 
evictions. The confluence of the separatist 
and the radical left movements in Barcelona – 
with many points of intersection and conflict 
between them – has made the city of Barcelona 
perhaps Europe’s most significant stage for 
political resistance to the impact of crisis and 
austerity. In other words, the potential for an 
alternative politics is at its strongest in one of 
the cities worst affected by the 2008 crash. 
“The other crises did not exactly provoke a 
radical political change towards the left, but 
this time, as a result of many factors, there 
has been a political change in the city and, 
relatively, a political and ideological change 
at the Catalan level (...)” (Journalist)
Cities Can Lead a Social and 
Political Renaissance
The first two years of the BeC government 
have generated great expectations about the 
potential for building a new left political project 
from the bottom-up, with cities playing a 
central role. The political agenda of Barcelona 
en Comú combines the classical political 
principle of social and spatial redistribution 
with those of localism (municipalism), radical 
forms of coproduction and commoning 
(where “commons” refer to resources held 
in trust for, belonging to or affecting a whole 
community, but not under direct state control). 
“ … (I’ve always felt) a strong commitment 
with municipalism and with the idea that we 
do not only replace people in power, but also 
change the ways of doing things. We must open 
the institutions. If there is a place from where 
you can do this, it is the city” (Councillor)
“The Commons aren’t spaces owned by 
the public sector, but they represent a 
shared and common wealth. The attributes 
of universality, redistribution, accessibility... 
characteristic of the Public are missed in 
many public administration projects. This 
is why I think that the Commons are more 
capable of acting as the Public than the public 
administration itself” (Government Official)
Barcelona is the capital of Catalonia, a 
region with a powerful national identity in 
the northeast of Spain. With a population of 
1,608,746, it is the second biggest city in 
the country, after Madrid. Since the Olympic 
Games in 1992, Barcelona has become a 
tourist hotspot. The strength of its tourist 
sector, together with a highly diversified and 
internationalised economy, makes it one 
of the most prosperous cities in Spain. 
The economic crash of 2008 hit the socio-
economic structure of the city very badly, 
provoking a sharp increase in poverty, 
social exclusion and social inequalities. The 
unemployment rate rose to 18.6% in 2012 
(23.8% in Catalonia; 25% in Spain). The  
at-risk-of-poverty rate reached 18.2 in 2011 
(20.5 in Catalonia; 20.6% in Spain). Income 
inequalities rose sharply in the years of the 
economic recession and the gap between 
the household disposable income of the 
richest and the poorest neighbourhoods grew 
rapidly at the same time. Despite signs of 
economic recovery, the legacies of the crisis 
are ever-present in terms of job insecurity, 
public sector retrenchment, housing exclusion 
and social and spatial polarisation. 
The politics of Barcelona have changed 
dramatically since the start of the crisis. After 
32 years of centre-left city government led 
by the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), the 
local elections of 2011 brought a conservative 
coalition to power, led by City Mayor Xavier 
Trias (2011 – 2015). The 2011 election 
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However, the Obstacles Facing 
the New Left are Formidable
The first two years of the BeC coalition 
show the enormity of the obstacles to radical 
change. First of all, BeC lacks a solid majority 
in the City Council, forcing it into coalition 
with the electoral rump of the PSC. It also 
faces resistance from within the municipal 
bureaucracy, fiscal centralisation by the regional 
and national austerity regimes and a lack of 
municipal power in key policy arenas - notably 
housing. Larger constraints facing all cities to 
a greater or lesser extent include the global 
nature of economic and financial flows, and 
the pro-austerity ideology driven by the mass 
media and economic elites. As a member 
of a community based organisation said: 
“The tools are very tiny and the expectations 
are great. How can the City Council of a city 
that is globally located on the map of the 
relevant cities in the world, which attracts 
migratory flows, capital flows… how can it 
manage a power that it does not have? The 
City Council does not have the power of the 
city. It is a very small portion of power”
This reality means that while Barcelona’s new 
municipalism and commitment to radical co-
production represents an important beginning, 
it cannot be the end of the transformatory 
process. Urban struggles must gain traction 
on the national and international stages. 
Cities must Unite Upwards and 
Outwards to Defeat Austerity
At the same time, there is room for manoeuvre. 
Our respondents highlighted a repertoire 
of strategies that local governments can 
use to promote radical political change. At 
the institutional level, these include making 
maximum creative use of the powers granted 
to municipalities and investing surpluses and 
reserves rather than hoarding them (a demand 
made by trade union activists in Leicester). 
Another crucial strategy is to build political 
alliances between cities, social movements and 
community organisations to confront and exert 
pressure on upper tiers of government. We 
found that in combination, these approaches 
transform citizen perceptions of what is possible 
and makes political radicalisation infectious in 
and beyond the city, at the regional and  
national scales. 
 
Our conclusions are twofold. First, the 
city council needs the movements and the 
movements need the city council.  
 
Second, to resist austerity imposed at 
higher tiers of government, cities must unite 
nationally and internationally, in a common 
struggle. Mayor Ada Colau summed up 
the place of Barcelona in this struggle.
“I believe that Barcelona is key to redefining 
politics and that municipalism is essential to 
improving our democracy. This is the century 
of women and the century of cities. And 
there is no better way forward in this exciting 
political moment than the new municipalism, 
where government is at its closest to the 
citizens. I can´t think of a better city than 
Barcelona, highly esteemed and followed 
with great international interest. This change 
of political agenda has been implemented 
through this mandate and it is delivering 
results” (Nació Digital, 10/04/2017).
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DUBLIN: A CENTRALISING BUT 
CONTESTED AUSTERITY REGIME
Something of a political renaissance is  
occurring across the city as individuals and 
communities become involved in diverse 
practices of resistance, resilience,  
solidarity and support.
Austerity hits the poorest hardest
There were eight austerity budgets in Ireland 
between the years 2008 and 2014 and their 
impacts have been sharp and deep. There has 
been a significant rise in unemployment, the 
overall percentage of people in poverty has 
risen to 15.8 per cent, and inequality has risen 
sharply. The significantly gendered nature of 
austerity effects has also been noted. In Dublin, 
where rates of deprivation have increased 
significantly over the austerity years, rising 
from 10.5 per cent in 2008 to 28.1 per cent 
in 2013, there is broad agreement among our 
participants that austerity has hit the poorest 
hardest although the middle-classes have also 
been severely affected. As one respondent 
noted, “The government did not stand up to 
the bullies. It chose to stand up to the weak. 
And so austerity and harshness was very one-
sided … They picked on the weakest people 
– subliminally as much as consciously” (Social 
Researcher). The injustice of this unequal 
burden-sharing was highlighted by many 
respondents. As another noted in the course 
of one of our Focus Groups, “What strikes 
me with austerity is that it’s hugely unjust. It’s 
hugely unfair. And that we’re being forced 
to carry burdens for a class of people who 
basically are financial speculators. And they 
speculated and lost. Instead of carrying their 
losses, they put them onto us” (Resident). 
Dublin, Ireland’s capital city has a population of 
1.3 million and is home to a third of the country’s 
population. Economic activity in the Dublin 
region accounts for 47 per cent of Ireland’s 
GDP and it has the highest average disposable 
income per person in the country. Dublin is 
now ranked third in the world for foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It serves as a hub for global 
IT and software companies in particular, and 
several of the world’s largest IT firms have 
their headquarters in Dublin. Consequently, 
the city’s attractiveness to both domestic and 
international investors is one of the principal 
driving forces of urban planning and policy. 
Commercial rates also form the principal source 
of funding for Dublin City Council (DCC). 
Dublin has used austerity to 
consolidate pro-business policies
As many of our respondents noted, austerity in 
Dublin has therefore served as an ideology to 
expand and consolidate many of the policies and 
programmes in place since the 1990s, which 
aim at making the city attractive to investors 
and developers while ignoring or containing 
marginalisation and dissent. Indeed, as our 
research indicates, austerity has provided an 
opportunity to further curtail and control the 
activities of civil society groups while targeting 
cuts at the most marginalised. While, as the 
Irish Finance Minister with an eye on the global 
markets likes to note, Ireland is certainly not 
Greece and Dublin not Athens, public  
anger and frustration at the cuts meted  
out in the name of austerity is palpable. 
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There has been a drop of 21 per cent in mean 
disposable income across the city and the drop 
in the income of the unemployed is reported to 
stand at 22 per cent. Correspondingly, the rate 
of unemployment rose from 38,000 in 2006 
to a high of 90,000 in 2012. Although this 
figure dropped to 75,000 in 2015, interview 
respondents highlight consistent difficulties in 
meeting debt and bill payments, and poverty 
and inequality remain widespread and pervasive. 
While the government constantly stresses that 
core welfare benefits have not been touched 
in austerity budgets, the extensive cuts to 
support and services across a wide range of 
sectors have indirectly affected many. As one 
of our Focus Group participants notes, “They 
don’t hit you straight on the thing, but all the 
supports have been taken away” (Resident). 
For example, funding to the programme tackling 
the growing drug epidemic in the city is 
reported to be down by 44 per cent and many 
other funding lines have ceased altogether.
Austerity is a lost opportunity for 
developing local democracy
Local government in Ireland is extremely weak 
and Irish governance is characterised by an 
exceedingly high degree of centralisation. 
Dublin City Council is no exception. The 
much touted local government reforms which, 
as part of austerity, promised greater levels 
of local democracy, in reality manifested as 
budget cuts (reported to be in the region of 
20-25%) coupled with increased responsibility 
(for local community development). As 
for any other reforms, there is broad 
agreement that these did not happen. 
Many respondents were adamant that this 
represented a deliberate strategy on the part of 
the state. As another notes, “It felt like the civil 
servants were waiting in the long grass…. It 
felt a bit like slash and burn… There was a bit, 
kind of, we’ll teach you a lesson, and protect 
the core - the core being themselves, you 
know?” (Community representative). Another 
commented that this constituted a government 
priority under austerity, “Certainly I think one 
of the priorities in the present government, 
they made no secret of the fact that when they 
came into power, the days of Partnerships and 
[community] Task Forces and this, that and 
the other would - I think the phrase that was 
often used, that they would clip their wings. 
And they did.” (Politician). For remaining 
groups, their activities are now limited to a 
’services only’ function (research and advocacy 
are no longer funded) and their remit in this 
has been greatly increased. For example, one 
organisation we visited has gone from covering 
an area comprising 15,000 people to one 
comprising 125,000 with no attendant increase 
in personnel. When asked how they will now 
manage to engage with communities, one of the 
organisation’s employees wryly noted that “well, 
it’s necessarily going to be a superficial process’
The cuts to and control of civic organisations 
has fed into communities in a number of ways. 
In addition to the obvious impact of reduced 
services and support to communities, the narrow 
‘no advocacy’ nature of state funding leaves 
organisations feeling silenced and communities 
without advocates. Thus, the important spaces 
that once existed for critique and dissent within 
local communities have also been narrowed, 
if not shut down. As one of our respondents 
noted, “…you felt your voice was, you felt as 
if you were strangled because you couldn’t 
actually actively criticize if you were getting 
funding. You didn’t have an independent voice. 
And most of the organisations were relying 
on government funding. And so in a way, you 
were, you know, muzzled really.” (CBO). 
 
Citizens respond to Austerity in diverse, 
innovative and rebellious ways
“People are just incensed. Not because they 
are the left-wing. Not because they are radical 
revolutionists. It’s because they’ve been shafted. 
They can see that they do not have pensions. 
They see no future for their kids” (Councillor).
While the logic and practices of austerity 
governance in Dublin certainly resonate 
with those of other cities within this project, 
the various and diverse public reactions to 
them highlight some particularities. The so-
called ‘water protests’ at the introduction of 
new water charges in 2014 have perhaps 
received the most publicity. However, our 
respondents repeatedly emphasised that these 
protests were never just about water. They 
were simply the final straw for a frustrated, 
tired, angry populace who decided enough 
was enough. As one of our respondents 
noted, “What people wanted, people wanted 
something to voice their concern. People 
wanted something to voice their anger. And 
they saw this as mechanism. But it’s not 
in any sense just about water.” (CBO). 
Nor was this ever a single-tactic movement. 
Public marches caught the media headlines, 
but the movement adopted a wide variety 
of tactics and strategies. Two features, in 
particular, single out this movement as unique 
in the history of the Irish state. The first is the 
diversity of people involved. A survey carried 
out in 2015 of 2,556 people involved found 
that 54 per cent were ‘new activists’ – i.e. had 
As one official noted, “Austerity was a time, in 
my view, to get reform, and a lot of the austerity 
was actually done under the heading of reform. 
It wasn’t. We got very little reform… I think 
an opportunity was lost.” (Council Official).
Many councillors were even more blunt. 
In the words of one, “We have all the talk 
about political reform, but there’s no reform. 
Reform means cuts.”. (Councillor) 
Austerity has consolidated a  
state-led attack on civil society groups
As well as cutting back (while paradoxically 
adding to the work of) the City Council, austerity 
has also provided the opportunity to consolidate 
the state’s move to ‘rationalise’ (cut) civil society 
groups and more closely align (subsume) 
them to local government, through newly 
established Local Community Development 
Committees. According to participants, these 
operate in an extremely formulaic manner, 
leaving no room for deliberation or debate. 
Although moves to shut down civil society 
groups began with reduced state support 
to them around 2002, efforts to keep them 
going were dealt a major blow over the 
austerity period. Cuts are reported to have 
amounted to 35 per cent, with the smaller, 
more politically active community organisations 
bearing the brunt of these. According to 
of our one respondents, “there were about 
55,000 people working in the community 
sector, and, after austerity, there were about 
20,000 that were taken out of the mix. So, 
there was just a massive cull, if you like, 
at that level.” (Community Activist). 
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LEICESTER:  
A CASE OF “AUSTERITY REALISM”
never protested about anything in their lives 
before; and the reasons cited by 60 per cent 
of these was that “austerity has gone too far”. 
Moreover, many of our respondents observe 
that a high proportion of those involved are 
women. Thus, rather than mobilising what one 
might regard as ‘the usual suspects’ – the 
‘angry mob’ as the mainstream media chose 
to present it - resistance to austerity has cut 
across classes and neighbourhoods throughout 
the city. And, as a movement, it has grown 
and developed organically from the ground 
up. Although there are attempts by some left-
wing parties to channel these ‘new’ activists 
into formal politics, our respondents report 
that many prefer alternative political avenues 
in their quest for social justice. The challenge 
now is to engage these new political actors 
in innovative and non-traditional ways
What Next? A new politics and 
practices of engagement is required
“I think there’s something fundamentally that’s 
changed in terms of people’s psyche in terms of 
how they see the world. Where previously they 
would have accepted it, a bit like the [Catholic] 
Church. They would have accepted it. Now 
they say, ‘Hold on,’ you know. ‘The emperor 
has no clothes’. And once you switch that on in 
people, they start to see other things.” (CBO)
Leicester is a medium-sized city of some 
342,000 people in the East Midlands region. 
Perhaps its most unique feature is its “super-
diversity”, with black and minority ethnic 
groups on the cusp of becoming a majority 
of the city’s population. It is a stronghold 
of the UK Labour Party, which dominates 
Leicester City Council (LCC). Labour’s Sir 
Peter Soulsby has held the office of City 
Mayor since it was established in 2011, 
winning two elections with 55% of the vote. 
Once known as a prosperous city that “clothed 
the world”, Leicester has long suffered acute 
deprivation linked to the collapse of key 
industries in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent 
government statistics show that in 2014, 
Leicester had the lowest gross disposable 
household income in the UK, a mere £12,071. 
Gross average weekly pay per worker stood at 
just 81% of the national average, the 7th lowest 
in the UK. For many thousands of Leicester’s 
citizens, paid work offers no escape from 
poverty. The city could ill afford David Cameron’s 
“age of austerity”, now in its eighth year. 
Austerity is Deeply Embedded 
in Local Governance Culture
“We are not happy making cuts but we cannot 
set an illegal deficit budget. If we do Eric 
Pickles will simply come in and take over 
the running of the council” (Councillor). 
It is striking just how deeply austerity politics 
have become embedded in the governing 
culture and political psyche of English municipal 
elites. This is exemplified in Leicester, where the 
City Council made a strategic decision, though 
opposed to austerity in principle, not to be vocal 
in challenging the UK government. We call this 
approach “austerity realism”. By this, we mean 
that while most of our respondents in the City 
Council detest austerity, they deliver it diligently, 
though reluctantly, for lack of a perceived 
alternative. The preceding quotation highlights 
just how weak British local government remains, 
and its political subordination to the centre. 
Apart from running down reserves, councils 
cannot resist austerity without breaking the law. 
Austerity realism translates into a strategy for 
managing and mitigating the worst effects of 
cuts to benefits and services, alongside an 
increasingly vigorous urban growth strategy, 
spearheaded by the City Mayor. The logic 
of austerity realism means that governing 
energies are consumed, on the one hand, 
with trying to preserve public services as far 
as possible while providing a safety net amid 
seemingly endless cuts and restructuring, 
and on the other hand with enhancing the 
competitive position of Leicester. Although 
many respondents would like things to be 
different, visions for Leicester’s future were 
largely confined by this dual imperative. 
By 2020, the UK government will have cut 
Leicester’s budget for discretionary services 
– those it does not have to provide by law - 
by 63%. Abolition of the central government 
Revenue Support Grant to local authorities, 
also by 2020, marks the end not of central 
government control over local politics, but of 
local fiscal equity. Cities with weak economies 
are to be left reliant on meagre council tax 
Austerity governance in Dublin may well 
be remembered as much by its political, as 
its economic and social impacts. As social 
and psychological costs escalated, the 
city experienced something of a political 
renaissance. While some of our respondents 
echo mainstream framing of public resistance 
as ‘ugly’ and ‘anti-democratic’, the majority view 
this as a positive development. Dublin may not 
be Athens or Barcelona, but nor is it Leicester 
with its ‘austerity realism’ (see below). A new 
and diverse political class has emerged and 
one of the key lessons from the past few years 
is that public resistance cannot be controlled 
and contained. Authorities ignore it at their peril. 
The challenge for Dublin’s policymakers and 
planners now is to learn from others how to 
balance the different interests across the city by 
substantively engaging with these new political 
actors. This will be no easy task given the huge 
damage caused by austerity. It will require new 
politics and practices of engagement, which 
break with historic practices of co-option 
and containment. And it will require time – to 
rebuild trust and relations among angry and 
disaffected communities across the city.
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Yet, while most respondents thought that 
the city has little alternative but to follow this 
path - reflecting austerity realism, few thought 
that making Leicester attractive for employers 
and investors would, on its own, overcome 
decades of deprivation and disinvestment, only 
intensified by austerity. Research in this field 
shows that the more cities compete to make 
ends meet, the more unequal and divided they 
tend to become. Our research records the 
enormous gap between a vision of urban life 
represented by the culturally and economically 
vibrant city centre and the multicultural 
experience of impoverishment under austerity. 
Austerity is Damaging Local 
Voluntary and Community Groups 
One of our core research questions concerned 
the role of collaboration between government 
and voluntary and community organisations in 
managing and mitigating austerity. Confronting 
the failures and antagonisms of the “state” and 
“market” sectors, policy entrepreneurs often 
look for alternatives in “civil society”, and the 
potential for a stronger partnership between the 
state and communities. We found collaboration 
between the city council and voluntary 
organisations to be very important, for example 
in trying to mitigate the impact of austerity on 
people affected by welfare reform and benefit 
sanctions. Yet, austerity has severely weakened 
the foundations of any partnership in pursuit of 
progressive, inclusionary or egalitarian goals. 
Many of our respondents pointed to the ways 
in which austerity undermines local voluntary 
and community groups, contradicting the 
tenets of David Cameron’s so-called “big 
society”. For example, ”the pressure to 
reduce benefit spend and get people back 
into work has meant that we have far fewer 
volunteers because people are dissuaded from 
volunteering by the DWP” (VCS respondent). 
At the same time, swathes of the voluntary 
sector have been wiped out by cuts, decimating 
government-civil society networks that once 
supported public welfare, and denying a voice to 
communities worst affected by austerity.  Grants 
have mostly disappeared, while contract funding 
is sparse, short term, bureaucratic, competitive 
and precarious. The result is a hollowed out 
voluntary and community sector engaged in 
a relentlessly competitive struggle for survival 
and with diminishing ability to voice the needs 
of citizens or speak truth to power. One VCS 
respondent derided this short-term contract 
approach as “dollop-funding”. For example, 
Leicester City Council used to fund several 
Black and Minority Ethnic umbrella organisations 
as a means to support inter-community dialogue 
and capacity building.  Under austerity, this 
approach is no longer deemed viable. One 
respondent commented angrily on the impact 
of de-funding on the BME community groups:
“All that is left of the African Caribbean 
voluntary and community sector is a few single 
issue clubs/associations, and a number of 
small volunteer run, led and managed social 
groups that do not have the means, capacity 
or capability to fulfil a link or communication 
function. Sadly the poor outcomes achieved by 
the African Caribbean community have changed 
very little since the Scarman Centre report 
20 years ago because the Black community 
in Leicester is small and dispersed enough 
to ignore politically. It migrated here to help 
fill labour shortages after the war, suffered 
unremitting institutional race discrimination 
but has made significant contributions to 
receipts and business rate revenues. If things 
continue as they are, little will remain of the 
post-war multi-service municipality, apart 
from adult and children’s social services. But 
without a significant change of direction, even 
these services seem likely to remain trapped 
in a regime of permanent budgetary crisis. 
The “Devolution” Agenda: 
Double-Dealing?
With services cut beyond the bone, many 
local authorities and sub-regions are keen 
to agree “devolution deals” with central 
government in order to draw down further 
powers and resources. The case of Leicester 
and Leicestershire is a salutary lesson 
in the power relations at stake. Said one 
public official of the “localism” agenda: 
“There isn’t one” … “It’s very top down. You 
know, they have their national priorities and 
that’s that. And there is no bottom up”. 
In 2016, Leicester and Leicestershire attempted 
to win government approval for a new 
“combined authority” operating across Leicester 
and the county of Leicestershire, with devolved 
powers over infrastructure and economic 
development. The government rejected the 
proposal, because, sensibly, the city and county 
refused to countenance the demand for a new 
sub-regional “Metro-Mayor”. Had Leicester 
agreed to this, the current City Mayor would 
have lost his economic development powers, 
leaving the city at the mercy of a higher authority 
with potentially very different political priorities. 
Our key finding is that behind the rhetorics 
of “devolution” and “localism”, central 
government sets the agenda and pulls the 
strings in a way that emasculates prospects 
for a just and equitable city. Said an official: 
“I think this is very obvious when you see 
the pattern of where the money is going 
and where it’s not, it’s going to those areas 
who have accepted devolution deals based 
around the idea of a metropolitan mayor, 
and …the government has decided that is 
the appropriate form of governance and it 
is rewarding those areas who agree with it 
and punishing those areas who don’t”. 
Renaissance for Whom? A 
Competitive City is not a Just City
Despite grim deprivation indices, Leicester has 
cultivated a sense of renaissance in the past 
few years. The city centre has transformed, with 
new developments and investments continuing 
apace. Two unexpected dividends – the 
discovery in 2012 of the remains of King Richard 
III and Leicester City winning the English 
soccer Premier League in 2016 – gave the 
city a significant cultural and economic boost.  
Leicester rightly prides itself on ethnic super-
diversity, and makes full use of the economic 
potentialities in branding the city.  According 
to a councillor, “people I know they did not 
bring money with them but they brought their 
cultural ways, heritage, tradition”. Through their 
economic contribution to the city, “they have put 
it on the World Map”. As the City Mayor put it in 
a public lecture, Leicester is at last getting over 
the “collective inferiority complex” brought about 
by industrial collapse and earlier rounds of local 
government restructuring. He argued that while 
supporting schools and services is a priority, 
the Council must invest in the “public realm 
because the city centre is our shop window”. 
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“They say to us ‘why aren’t the English kicking 
off like the Greeks’”? “I think it is precisely 
around the issue of everyone is being made 
to look at their own individual crisis and they 
are so basically swept up in trying to deal with 
that, that it is very difficult for them to look at it 
in a wider way which I think would potentially 
help every individual; but they are so ensnared 
in looking at the latest change affecting them, 
that its a full time job sorting out these issues”.
While “drama and conflict” may not be in the 
interests of Leicester from the standpoint of 
investment and growth (Councillor), some of our 
respondents thought that a more contentious 
and rebellious politics could serve the cause 
of democratic revitalisation and social justice. 
This contentious spirit lurks beneath the 
surface of austerity realism within the trade 
unions, among campaigners and within parts 
of the local voluntary and community sector. 
As one respondent commented,“perhaps we 
should just feedback ‘we need revolution!’” … 
“campaign against austerity – like they did in 
Iceland” … “I hate them, I really do. I’m sorry, 
I should be impartial …” This sentiment also 
exists among many councillors and officials, 
delivering an agenda that clashes with their 
own beliefs and values. The challenge for 
anti-austerity activists is to translate such 
feelings into a positive agenda for change and 
a credible vision for the future. To this end, 
the Labour Party surge at the 2017 general 
election may prove to be a watershed. 
the development of ‘multicultural’ Leicester 
only to find that when the going gets tough 
again the Black community loses what little it 
has had. Only time will tell on the impact”. 
At the same time as local voluntary and 
community organisations are closing or scaling 
back, other third-sector organisations are 
becoming ever-larger, creating a new category 
of what the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations calls “super majors”. Our 
research suggests that these organisations, 
which usually lack connections with local 
people, are squeezing out local groups. 
One respondent commented “… there’s the 
rhetoric of localism, but then when it comes to 
contracts – be it grants, procurement contracts 
… you’re offering large-scale contracts, 
you’re setting quite important barriers to 
grassroots or community-based organisations. 
And so, you found that large organisations 
are taking the money and then top-slicing 
their admin management fees. … But big 
charities are doing the same behaviours”. 
Austerity has done enormous damage to the 
voluntary and community sector infrastructure 
that, for all its flaws, did have connections 
with local people, and could provide voice, 
advice, services and support.  In this context, 
putting the onus on “civil society” to solve 
the crises of austerity is wildly unrealistic. 
The capacity is not there. Crucially, even in 
a renewed era of high growth and generous 
public spending it could take decades to 
rebuild what austerity has destroyed. 
“I think the cuts to the council’s budget has a 
more profound effect than people understand. 
And it may take a while before clearly you 
know something falls down. It maybe two or 
three years before you really realise that they 
would’ve sorted that if they’ve been here. They 
would’ve have communicated with us about that 
if they’ve been here. But sooner or later and of 
course these things take ages to build up. To 
build up a strong civic society takes a long time. 
And then you cut it down. It’s like planting a 
tree. It will take years for it to grow again … they 
take a very, very long time to build” (Councillor). 
One of our most important conclusions is that 
“civil society” is no panacea for austerity. On 
the contrary as our research in Athens and 
Baltimore also demonstrates, the third sector 
often serves privileged groups and special 
interests, enjoys a symbiotic relationship with 
corporate and government elites and lacks 
democratic legitimacy. Equally, by eroding local 
voluntary and community organisations, austerity 
is also damaging the social fabric required for 
building just, equitable and inclusive city.
What Can Cities Do? For a Social 
and Political Renaissance
Cultures of resistance to austerity in Leicester 
have been seriously undermined by waves of 
de-industrialisation and the related decline of 
militant trade unionism. Said a councillor of 
the cuts, “a lot of them are happening almost 
without a squeak”. There had not been the 
“howls of protest” they expected. An official 
suggested “that confrontation thing is…
that’s just not the British spirit anymore”. 
However, we encountered important instances 
of successful resistance to austerity cuts, 
where a service was highly valued by citizens, 
opposition well organised, and protestors 
had allies in the Council itself. The Council’s 
decision to reverse the closure of Belgrave 
Library showed what a vigorous campaign 
can do. Yet, as is the case throughout the UK, 
austerity has been delivered with few signs of 
any sustained revolt. Our research points to 
a variety of reasons to do with the enduring 
legacies of defeat experienced by Labour local 
authorities and industrial trade unions during the 
1980s. But austerity itself plays a disorganising 
role too. As one interviewee commented: 
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GREATER DANDENONG, MELBOURNE:  
RESTRUCTURING AND REVITALISING 
A DIVERSE CITY
Melbourne is the capital city of the state of 
Victoria and the second most populous city in 
Australia, with 4.5 million people spread over 
more than 9,900 square km. The sprawling 
metropolis is governed via a multi-level system 
of centralised, state and dispersed and diverse 
local governments. Our research focused on 
the City of Greater Dandenong a significant 
municipal region 30kms southeast of the 
Melbourne central business district. Traditionally 
a seat of industrial activity, Dandenong has 
experienced sectoral economic decline as 
part of the long-term contraction of Australian 
manufacturing.  However, the population of 
Dandenong (currently around 153,000) is rising 
and projected to increase to 165,000 by 2019. 
In the context of substantial poverty and 
inequality, waves of multi-ethnic migration 
have presented the opportunity for Greater 
Dandenong to develop the “community 
economy”. 2011 census data showed that while 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander residents 
accounted for only 0.4% (a legacy of 19th 
century European settlement), Vietnamese 
people account for 12.5% and Indians 10.6%, 
with Sri Lankan, Cambodian and Chinese 
immigrants also comprising significant minorities 
among the population. Rather like Leicester, 
migrant communities have been able to assert 
a stake in the area’s commercial, retail and 
property sectors, and influence its politics. 
The concept of “Austerity” Does 
not Travel to Dandenong
In response to de-industrialisation, the 
State of Victoria has been rolling out a 20-
year regeneration project, “Revitalising 
Central Dandenong” (RCD 2005-25). The 
project commenced with an unprecedented 
investment in a single urban renewal site 
of AUS$290 million.  This investment 
supported land acquisition, staff costs and 
infrastructure development over the first 
five years of the project life.  It leveraged 
both considerable private investment (the 
aim is for a 1:10 public to private ratio in 
investment) as well as local government 
spending of approximately AUS$120 million 
in complementary improvement projects. This 
model of urban revitalisation will seem familiar 
to British readers involved in New Labour’s 
regeneration projects of the early 2000s.
However, a key finding from our study is that 
many concepts operating in European cities 
today do not work in the same way for Greater 
Dandenong, or Australia more broadly. For 
example, “austerity” is not widely used to 
describe or conceptualise cutbacks, constraints 
or institutional change (e.g. privatisation).  
Instead of austerity, “fiscal conservatism” is 
the dominant concept for both major national 
(and state) political blocs. This signals 
a political trend towards restraint in public 
revenue and expenditure over the last 15 years 
(and earlier), evidenced in cutbacks in specific 
areas and reductions of institutional effort 
and capacity. But this is occurring without the 
sense of emergency or purpose pertaining to 
“austerity”. According to a state official: 
 
“…austerity is a term that is talked about by 
people in Europe, we think about it more as 
a heavily constrained fiscal outlook where 
there is largely a flat line or negative growth in 
discretionary spending because revenue isn’t 
growing. This combines with increasing service 
delivery pressures (e.g. with ageing population) 
to create the constrained fiscal environment.” 
 
Even so the aspiration of fiscal conservatism 
has been more honoured in the breach, with 
expenditure and revenue across all levels of 
government at historically high levels throughout 
the 2000s. Perhaps most significantly, the 
Tony Abbott government failed in its attempt 
to impose a full-blooded austerity budget in 
2014. The scale of government resources 
allocated to revitalising Greater Dandenong is 
a good example of this relative fiscal flexibility, 
when compared with the evisceration of urban 
programmes in the UK, parts of Europe and  
the US.  
 
However, although “austerity” doesn’t bite, 
the notion of “crisis” does. The term is used to 
define and rationalise looming threats, more 
than it is to describe present governance 
challenges: anxiety-provoking memes such 
as ‘debt crisis’, ‘budget crisis’ or ‘health 
crisis’. Notable in our case study was the 
notion of an impending ‘migrant crisis’, which 
creates a sense of “othering” and could have 
consequences for communities that trade 
on their diversity, like Greater Dandenong.
In a System of Weak Local Government, 
the State of Victoria Dominates 
Urban Politics and Policy
The state-centred political system meant that 
the enthusiasm characteristic of pre-austerity 
Europe for institutionalised state-market-civil 
society partnerships at the city, municipal and 
neighbourhood levels, was also absent. Rather, 
our respondents are better versed in the idea 
of inter-governmental “integrated planning”. 
State governments and their agencies dominate 
in terms of resource power. Because city and 
municipal governments are weak, they are 
perceived to have limited capacity to take 
the lead in contexts that invite or demand the 
‘joining up’ of policy settings. Moreover, because 
“governance” is centred on “government”, 
the resilience of collaborative practices is 
vulnerable to changes of administration, through 
shifts in funding and - most importantly - 
political and policy reprioritisation. Compared 
with cities where multi-sector collaborative 
traditions are deeply embedded (such as the 
old Barcelona model), those in Dandenong 
are more vulnerable to the vagaries of politics 
and policy. In this sense they are weakly 
institutionalised, somewhat precarious 
mechanisms for incorporating citizens or 
voluntary and community organisations. 
At the same time, State officials talk a lot about 
collaboration, with repeated references to 
relationship-building, community-building, formal 
‘cross-government’ structures and processes, 
‘partnerships’ with non-government entities 
and informal strategies for delivering change 
in a multi-actor context.  This collaborative 
spirit is articulated in the revitalisation of 
Greater Dandenong, to which migrant cultural 
economies are considered central. In other 
words, if collaborative institutions are weak, 
the collaborative governing ethos is strong. 
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Food Governance Supports 
Development, Cohesion and Integration
Food governance shines a bright light on 
how cultural diversity is used for mobilising 
collaboration and revitalisation. First, it is used 
by government to bring people of different 
cultures together, support interaction and 
build understanding. “If you make some 
flat bread, you all get sit around and talk. 
And so, we’ve used it as a mechanism 
of engagement. In other words, food is 
recognised as a…social unifier to bring 
together” (local government representative). 
Second, food governance provides a 
practical way of responding to social needs 
in diverse communities, a link between 
government, non-government organisations 
and people in the community. For example, 
the Dandenong Food Alliance, a not for profit 
collaboration between local government and 
organisations provides food relief. Malnutrition 
is significant issue in Dandenong for low-
income groups, not only with limited access 
to healthy foods but to food per se. 
Third, food is a key driver of multi-cultural 
branding, and in developing a local tourism 
industry through collaboration between the 
local, State Governments and different cultural 
groups, creating places that offer specific 
cultural precincts or activities, such as the 
Afghan Bazaar or Little India. These cultural 
quarters serve as a “public realm”, creating 
familiar sites for gathering by cultural groups 
and drawing in other members of the public:
“…not only are they fantastic from a social 
cohesion point of view, they’re also destination 
drivers to Dandenong…to celebrate the 
diversity of the place, the diversity of the 
food offering” (former state official).
Commercial Success Has 
Allowed Migrant Communities 
to Win a Political Voice
Much as Leicester, the commercial successes 
of migrant groups in food, retail and land 
development, contributes to local economic 
prosperity and community cohesion. From 
this basis, migrant populations have become 
well organised and able to influence urban 
policy through political channels. For example, 
specific traders or community groups have 
flourished and are able to influence local policy 
through “advocacy, lobby and engagement” 
(local government representative). “They’ve 
grouped up and they have a strength that was 
unimagined in the 1980s when the Indo-
Chinese groups came. By grouping up, they 
have developed a voice in the community” 
(local Federal Member of Parliament). 
Another feature of government reflecting the 
success of migrant communities locally is 
the diversity in local political representation. 
For example, at the local level “Dandenong 
has had in the last five years a Buddhist 
mayor, a Muslim mayor, a Jewish mayor, 
a Christian mayor, and an atheist mayor”. 
The local government is a core member of 
the Inter Council Aboriginal Consultative 
Committee and supports the Dandenong and 
District Aborigines Co-operative Limited, a 
community controlled service organisation. 
Greater Dandenong positions 
itself as a Multi-cultural City
As we found in Leicester, cultural diversity 
is a central theme in the revitalisation effort, 
and plays a major role in mobilising actors 
and resources. Dandenong is a community 
that defines itself in terms of its capacity to 
have welcomed and integrated successive 
waves of migrants. These traditions are highly 
salient in its governing culture. For example, a 
representative from the local Interfaith Network 
described Dandenong as a place where there 
is “freedom to go wherever you want” and 
you will find “diversity and cohesion” with “no 
fear,” only an “openness, trust and invitation” to 
interact. “People are very proud of the diversity 
and want to preserve it. They see it as healthy”. 
These sentiments were common across the 
governmental, business and third sectors. 
In contrast with Australia’s discreditable 
treatment of Indigenous peoples, urban histories 
have long noted the dynamism, fluidity and 
positivity associated with diverse cultural inflows 
to cities. The positivity around diversity in 
Dandenong is seen as a vehicle for overcoming 
tensions. As a local official put it, “diversity is 
not seen as a threat; it’s a great thing and we 
want to praise it and celebrate it and remove 
any stigma of it: it is a very clear message”.
Diversity is a Key Tool of 
Urban Revitalisation
Our research suggests that not only has 
cultural diversity been a useful theme for 
building collaborative approaches to urban 
revitalisation, but also that the recognition of 
cultural diversity has underpinned and driven 
economic development. Where UK cities 
have dramatically scaled back services under 
austerity, the authorities of Greater Dandenong 
invest strongly in cultural diversity through 
services that support integration: for example 
settlement services, English language classes, 
libraries with specific programs, services 
and resources, police training (i.e. through 
multicultural liaison officers), targeted anti-
racism and domestic violence programmes, and 
general public education and health services. 
Greater Dandenong has particular affinities 
with Leicester, in the way that diversity “brands” 
the city and is seen as a tool of economic 
vitality. The business community sees migrant 
communities as contributing to and sustaining 
a diverse and resilient retail market. According 
to a representative of the State of Victoria’s 
lead renewal agency, the urban revitalisation 
process “built off the success of cultural 
diversity” to change perceptions about 
Dandenong “from a place suffering economic 
decline” to be seen as “a multicultural Mecca”. 
A State planning manager elaborated:
“… I think it comes back to that point of 
understanding what the essence of the place 
is…you could see 27 cultures that worked 
together regularly and respect one another. It’s 
the cultures and the background that those 
communities bring that makes it a unique 
place. And that’s what actually creates the 
outcomes. It is from this basis that the strategy 
for revitalisation and ‘place-making’ drew on 
cultural diversity as a theme, “give people a 
voice, engender pride in place and enable 
businesses to succeed” (state official).
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A notable theme emerging from the Dandenong 
case study is that of multi-cultural fluidity and 
peaceful co-existence. Whilst the degree of 
inter-community integration is a moot point, it 
does appear that public programmes and civic 
structures have allowed for and encouraged 
socio-spatial co-existence and formal dialogue 
among insider groups. We note, however, 
new strains in social discourse, in Greater 
Dandenong and more widely, around Islam and 
asylum seekers – and the historic and enduring 
For Montréal, Austerity is 
Therefore a Political Choice
While the immediate impact of the 2008 
financial crunch was thus rather soft, Montréal 
has undergone a series of consecutive and 
on-going crises since the end of “Fordism” 
– the period of mass industrial production 
– in the 1970s. The 2008 event was one 
rather minor occurrence in this long series. 
Consequently, austerity is not understood 
as a necessary policy in an exceptional time, 
as it is in Europe. It is rather presented as an 
ideological choice, a conservative approach to 
state restructuring in the context of a historic 
and enduring crisis of the welfare state. This 
type of politics – usually called “rigour” by 
the Quebec state government – was pursued 
at the federal level by the Conservative 
Harper administration until the election of 
the Liberal Justin Trudeau in November 2015 
and by the Liberal Couillard administration, 
at the provincial level, since April 2014. 
The local state in Montréal is a combination of 
three different tiers of government: the federal, 
the provincial and the municipal levels  
(and also involves intricate  
relationships with different layers of civil society 
and the economic elite). Each of these levels 
submits to different logics and ideologies. The 
new federal government was elected on a 
programme embracing a Keynesian approach 
to public spending and investments whereas 
the provincial government is still committed to 
reducing the provincial budget deficit. In order 
to understand the governance and politics of 
austerity in Montréal, we have to take account 
of all these elements: the meaning, significance 
and impact of austerity largely depends on 
which tier is implementing which particular set  
of policies.  
 
Although Montréal is socially and culturally 
dynamic, the city-region is facing challenges 
in terms of economic restructuring and 
political rescaling. The city has a population 
of 1,958,000, while 4,099,000 live in the 
metropolitan area. Montréal has around 
110,000 enterprises and an annual 
median income per household of $53,024. 
Unemployment stands at 7.8% of the active 
population. In the federal elections of 2015, 
Greater Montréal voted mostly for the Liberal 
Party, in the provincial elections of 2014, 
mostly for the Quebec Liberal Party. 
With its economy lagging behind many 
other cities of similar size in North America 
since the end of the 1970s, the local state 
has been involved in a continuing struggle 
to improve its performance in terms of job 
creation and support for innovation.
Montréal wasn’t hit by the 2008 crisis 
in the same way as European Cities
The 2008 economic crisis did not hit Montréal 
directly. However it did have an indirect impact: 
economic relationships with the US (investments 
and tourism, for example) suffered rapidly and 
dramatically, but they soon recovered or were 
substituted by exchanges with Europe and Asia. 
As a manager of a public institution devoted 
to international investments in Montréal said:
“We were affected, of course, in the sense 
that the economy in the general sense was 
affected. Also, the foreign investments, for 
Montréal International, come from the US and 
were largely reduced after the financial crisis. 
So a big change for Montréal International on 
this side but in the end Europe took over.” 
MONTRÉAL: A CITY IN SEARCH OF 
SOLIDARITY AGAINST LIBERAL “RIGOUR” 
injustices against Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples in urban Australia. Whether the 
celebration of diversity in Greater Dandenong 
can remain resilient to the ‘migrant crisis’ and 
the rising politics of racial intolerance, remains 
to be seen. The establishment of The Greater 
Dandenong Multicultural Advisory Committee 
in April 2017 to strengthen community 
relationships and increase collaboration 
with multicultural communities represents 
an acknowledgement of the importance of 
institutional support for ‘community wellbeing, 
harmony and prosperity’ in the city. 
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The Liberal provincial government is the key 
driver of austerity today. It is situated within a 
long history of Liberal politics where the state is 
seen as oversized, while citizens are overtaxed 
and are seen as being at risk of becoming 
attracted to populist discourses. Beyond 
the varied meanings and understandings of 
austerity, all fraught with a strong neoliberal 
connotation, a majority of the respondents in our 
research were worried about the repercussions 
of austerity measures, specifically on the poor 
and the households with low paying jobs. In fact, 
the restructuring of the welfare state impacts 
different sectors of the population differently. But 
all in all, budgets were cut mainly in health care 
and the education system and, as is common 
in austerity urbanism, these cuts hit the most 
vulnerable groups the hardest.  
 
“The austerity phenomenon is not as large, it is 
more precisely targeted than ten or thirty years 
ago. Education, social services, integration of 
immigrants, workforce integration... In these 
four sectors, in addition to social housing, 
five sectors where there are serious cuts. 
They stop the development - what we hoped 
would be a long term social development” 
(Community Development Worker) 
 
 
Austerity Creates Serious Dilemmas 
for the Community Sector 
In Montréal, collaboration is second nature 
to the different actors who intervene in the 
public debate. Governance structures have 
been in place since the 1980s notably with the 
Community Development Corporations (CDCs). 
One specific aspect of today’s austerity policies 
is the way they are implemented: largely by 
one-sided and authoritarian decisions by the 
Provincial government. There is little, if any, 
deliberation or consultation as to how and where 
the cuts should take place. This conflicts with 
the deliberative culture of Montréal. In this sense, 
different social actors, especially the community 
sector, have to deal with a top-down politics of 
austerity. As these organizations largely depend 
on government funding to function, they often 
end up managing austerity measures while, at 
the same time, contesting them. This creates 
dilemmatic, even contradictory imperatives. As 
a community development worker commented: 
“We find, again, this outsourcing of the state 
towards the community sector. (...). The 
relationship to the state (...) is a love/hate 
one, a conflicting collaboration where we tell 
ourselves ‘We have a mission, in the interest 
of the public, so public funds should finance 
what is in the interest of the public’. And at the 
same time we are very jealous of our autonomy 
even though the accountability mechanism 
are harsher than ever” (Community Worker). 
This example shows that austerity measures take 
place in a general context of state restructuring 
where the government, but also, consequently, 
community sector actors, are in search of a 
new model of social solidarity. More and more, 
“social entrepreneurship” and social economy 
are being called upon for different projects 
and this is seen as a way to outsource public 
services to the private sector. This may herald 
the transition to a new way of functioning, 
a search for a new regime of urban and 
public policies. At the same time, community 
organizations have to find different sources of 
funding and therefore have to compromise and 
work with the specifications of the different tiers 
of government, but also the charitable sector: 
much like Baltimore, Dublin and Leicester. 
Organisations and Movements 
Opposing Austerity and 
Restructuring are Fragmented
Most of our respondents had a very 
negative opinion of the ideology of austerity 
and its philosophy of state restructuring, 
pointing out its adverse, if not disastrous, 
impacts on marginalized and excluded 
populations. In Montréal, both the community 
sector and the trade unions have been 
active against austerity measures: 
“You’re right, they [trade unions] sometimes 
help us on some themes, for a short while. 
There is this round table called the Front for the 
defence of the non-unionized, in which different 
community groups intervene, like Au Bas de 
l’échelle, and us, and other groups. The trade 
union representatives are active, but they only 
do lobbying, that’s all” A community worker 
intervening in immigrants’ working rights” 
The convergence and unity between those two 
sectors remain fragile and unstable. They have 
divergent interests: the community sector is 
concerned with the most vulnerable population 
who are confronted with social exclusion while 
the trade unions defend working members. 
As one participant from the community sector 
pointed out: “On the one side there is the 
eternal alliance between the community 
organizations and the trade unions, on the other 
side community organizations are subjected 
to trade unions” (Community Worker)
 
 
Austerity is delivered from the top-
down and weakens local civil society
In Montréal we haven’t witnessed a large social 
movement where solidarity was built across 
the community sector and trade unions even 
though these two sectors denounce and fight 
against austerity measures and the outsourcing 
of the state. In the 1960s and 1970s, with the 
“Quiet Revolution”, Quebec invented a specific 
model of cooperation between the trade unions 
and civil society (understood as the community 
sector) supported by the State. This social-
democratic compromise was dubbed the 
Quebec Model. This has since been dismantled 
with the rise of free-market (neoliberal) ideology. 
With the model undermined by successive 
governments, there is now a need to think of 
new ways to manage public policies. This could 
be a moment for civil society to reinvent new 
ways of working. According to a community 
organisation manager: 
 
“I would say that there were certain types of – 
well not all of them, not if I was working for the 
government – but for other sectors, there was 
maybe more creativity in how do we get out 
of the austerity, in a certain way. This is what 
allowed the social economy to grow, to say: 
‘look, we have to do things differently’” 
 
Although austerity is not a new policy in Quebec 
and Montréal, and neoliberal reforms have been 
implemented at every level of government for 
many years, a radicalised authoritarian wave has 
been rolled out since the Liberal Party came to 
power in April 2014 – without any consultation 
at all. Local civil society organizations had to 
confront and adjust to these top-down policies 
and have had no time to debate or organize 
themselves against, or with, these policies. In 
this sense, the Liberal government is following 
a traditional definition of public action at odds 
with the local culture of collaboration. The 
consequences of this are difficult to assess 
and predict. What can be done? How can 
there be reinvestment? To what extent can 
the trade unions and the community sector 
offer an alternative way forward, in the face 
of this latest wave of neoliberal downsizing? 
As we conclude the study, Montréal sits 
at a series of possible tipping points.
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Situated on the Loire river estuary, some 50 
kilometres from the Atlantic coast, Nantes is a 
city with a population of approximately 300,000 
people. Since the closure of its shipyards at the 
end of the 1980s, it has undergone something 
of a transformation, generating new employment 
in the tertiary or service sector, especially in 
information technology and banking. Since 
the 1990s, under the firm leadership of Jean-
Marc Ayrault, who was Mayor of Nantes for 
almost 25 years, the city council has driven 
forward an agenda of economic boosterism and 
international competitiveness, designed around 
flagship urban regeneration projects (notably the 
redevelopment of the Ile de Nantes shipyards). 
Redevelopment was accompanied by a strategy 
of metropolitanisation (a term referring to the 
creation of city-regions), aiming to position 
Nantes as a regional growth city. Indeed, since 
2001 Nantes has progressively coordinated its 
policies and shared services within the inter-
communal or combined authority of Nantes 
Métropole. In 2015, the latter became one of 
France’s designated metropolitan authorities, 
which brought together over 24 local  
authorities and covers a population of some 
600,000 people.  
Nantes faces ‘Multiple Crises’: Invoking 
the Metaphor of ‘Décrochage’
Nantes has not escaped the impact of national 
austerity policies and cuts to local funding, 
although it is arguable that the city’s growing 
population and economic ‘attractiveness’ has 
enabled it to offset the impacts of the 2008 
crisis, when compared to other French cities. 
The poorest neighbourhoods and those with 
the lowest incomes have been hardest hit 
by the economic crisis. For example, in the 
neighbourhood of Bellevue, 40 per cent of the 
population live under the poverty threshold 
(compared to 10 per cent across the Nantes 
metropolitan area). Since 2008, the household 
income of the poorest 10 per cent living in 
Bellevue has fallen; unemployment remains 
double the rate of the rest of the metropolitan 
area; and the number of people employed in 
low-paid jobs has increased since 2009, at 
a rate quicker than elsewhere. Importantly, 
this impact of the crisis affects those living 
in historically poor areas of social housing, 
as well as those more deprived citizens in 
private accommodation. Neighbourhoods 
in the centre of Nantes have more diffused 
and variable levels of exclusion: populations 
below the poverty line in the centre of town 
are primarily single households in work. 
Importantly, the language of ‘austerity’ fails to 
resonate across governing circles in Nantes. 
Rather – a bit like Greater Dandenong - the 
crisis facing the city is regularly portrayed as 
a set of multiple crises, which brings together 
political dissatisfaction, fractured social bonds, 
as well as budgetary constraints. Thus, whilst it 
is not denied that the economic crisis has made 
local employment more fragile and scarce, local 
officers and politicians tend to focus, at the 
same time, on the crisis of social exclusion within 
communities and that of the French state and 
politics. In other words, Nantes represents itself 
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as experiencing a broader crisis, which is not of 
its own making, nor necessarily within its grasp 
to tackle. Indeed, one senior officer suggested 
that “we are facing a questioning of [the French 
state’s] very model of public service and its 
mode of social and economic development”. 
In part, and viewed through these different 
framings, the crisis facing Nantes can be 
understood through the generative metaphor 
of “décrochage” (a generative metaphor is a 
rhetorical device that frames and consolidates 
an influential interpretation of events). 
“Décrochage” foregrounds the ‘dropping 
off’ or ‘unhooking’ of communities from 
the economic motor that is Nantes and its 
metropolitan area. It helps structure a discourse 
that strongly resonates with the concept of 
social exclusion, as it was also understood in 
Britain under New Labour. Indeed, in the words 
of one local policy officer, “for people, the 
financial crisis is more about décrochage and 
isolation, and it is that which we are worried 
about, that is to say people exiting [what we 
might see as] the community of residents”. 
Décrochage also constructs the crisis 
in spatial terms. The crisis thus affects 
particular neighbourhoods, or what were 
termed “islands of real difficulty” across the 
city. Such constructions enable officials and 
politicians to focus on “localised difficulties 
[…] neighbourhood by neighbourhood” 
– using multiple indices of deprivation 
helps policy-makers to make visible the 
localisation of poverty. But, importantly, these 
neighbourhoods remain within the city, not 
formally administratively and geographically 
excluded like suburban areas in other major 
French cities. Thus, “décrochage” serves 
the significant political purpose of denoting 
Nantes as a vibrant city, whose challenge is 
to reconnect socially excluded groups and 
neighbourhoods to the growth engine. 
The City Promotes Co-production 
and Collaborative Governance
Articulated and imagined in these ways, 
collaborative governance and co-production 
have been interpreted as a ‘necessary’ response 
to the multiple crises facing Nantes. In fact, 
the current Mayor, Johanna Rolland, made 
citizen engagement and dialogue one of the 
priorities for her first term in office. The city 
council committed itself to renew participatory 
governance, promising a ‘constant dialogue’ 
between local councillors and citizens. Nantes 
has a long-established reputation as a city 
promoting community engagement. Indeed, 
as one officer acknowledged, Mayor Rolland 
has “made [..] the question of dialogue with 
citizens and other actors a mark of her political 
practice [...] It is even more than a conviction, 
it is a practice, including a personal practice, 
of public and political decision-making.”
These commitments to collaborative 
governance are deemed to go beyond the 
‘mere’ instrumental objectives of improved 
services and efficiencies. On the one hand, 
it is claimed that participation offers a better 
way of capturing the expertise of citizens as 
service-users, thus offsetting the deficiencies 
of traditional models of public service delivery. 
But, on the other hand, citizen dialogue 
is viewed as a means of countering the 
broader crisis of politics and building social 
capital and cohesion within communities. 
Importantly, this coupling of engagement to 
the commitment to social cohesion is said to 
distinguish community engagement practices 
across the city from narrow managerialism 
or service improvement measurements. 
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The commitment of Johanna Rolland to 
collaborative governance and co-production, 
evident in flagship projects such as the ‘Grands 
Débats’ – city-wide public debates on a variety 
of themes such as the future of the Loire river 
and energy transition - have furthermore been 
interpreted as a response by public authorities 
to the end of the ‘grand urban projects’ model 
of economic development, which characterised 
Nantes during the years of Jean-Marc Ayrault. 
 
 
The Flip Side: The Limits of Engagement
Nantes seems unable to escape the charges 
that have dogged attempts to engage 
citizens and communities across numerous 
cities, notably in the UK under New Labour. 
Critics label participation as a new mode 
of incorporation, little more than top-down 
information giving, or ultimately as an exercise 
in failed representation. This is evident in 
endeavours to characterize Nantes’ style of 
governance, which has often been compared 
to the famous passing game of its football 
team. Commenting on this analogy one of 
our respondents thus suggested that “the 
question asked is: who do you look for when 
building a team, and when [do] you pass 
the ball? […] You may pass the ball, but in 
the final instance you are obliged to follow 
[…] because the project is too advanced.” 
Such criticisms were mirrored in other 
assessments, which described neighbourhood 
forums as an “inconsistent [form of] democracy”, 
which “do not change fundamental decisions”, 
or which “too often… put [communities] in 
front of things” that have already been decided. 
It was claimed, for example, that practices of 
engagement often remained far too concerned 
with information-giving, so becoming little 
more than ‘pedagogy’, that is, “an attempt 
to explain the project”. And perhaps more 
importantly, in the context of “décrochage”, 
it was claimed by some respondents that 
participatory fora did not engage with those 
people most in need, challenging alleged 
efforts to combat social exclusion: for “people 
who are truly in vulnerable positions are not 
in the know, or do not keep themselves in 
the know, or are not free, for these types of 
things… they do not go to these meetings…” 
Indeed, questions were repeatedly asked 
about the legitimacy of those civil society 
actors that are involved in participatory forums 
and their capacity to represent communities 
across Nantes. They were charged with being 
‘apolitical’, non-adversarial and too deeply 
embedded in practices of ‘top-down’ urban 
governance. One neighbourhood officer 
commented that “we don’t invite organizations 
(such as trade unions) that we don’t know, but 
they don’t come knocking on the door either…. 
The associations involved in citizen’s dialogue 
are generally socio-cultural (ones) without an 
advocacy role… there are none which seize on 
these occasions to re-orientate urban policy.”
 
 
Political Decision Making: The Legitimacy 
and Limits of “Output” politics
Yet criticisms of the inability of communities 
to exercise powers of decision-making were 
repeatedly countered by the perceived value 
of keeping them in the hands of locally elected 
politicians. The Nantes model clearly embeds 
decision-making in the hands of locally elected 
representatives, while downplaying claims that 
participatory decision-making practices subsist 
below those of representative democracy. 
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Decision-making resides with politicians, so 
that participatory spaces are seen to be spaces 
of support rather than places of contestation 
between citizens and political decision-makers. 
As one officer puts it, “in Nantes, it is clear 
that it is the elected member who has the 
final decision”. In other words, councillor or 
politically-led decision-making is deemed to be 
no ‘bad thing’, as “it is [the local politicians] job 
after all.” 
 
Indeed, the basis for judgements about 
the governance of the city quickly shifted 
ground, moving from input to output forms 
of legitimacy, thus validating practices of co-
production. This is captured in the widely-
held belief that “most people are happy with 
what has been done.” In other words, there 
is a widely recognised tension between the 
managerial drive for efficiencies through 
co-production and the stated aim of the 
“renewal of local public action”. At the heart 
of these concerns is also the criticism of an 
increasingly technocratic decision-making 
process which is viewed as framing decision-
making in ways that do not reflect the original 
ambitions of co-production and citizen dialogue 
advanced by elected members, while at the 
same time creating inefficiencies and failing 
to meet the aspirations of engaged citizens.
 
In, outside and against the local 
state: The Risk of Parallel Systems 
At the same time, it is difficult to ignore that 
much of the resistance and challenge to socio-
economic crisis and austerity tends to exist in 
parallel to the formal participatory apparatus 
of urban governance. Neighbourhood forums 
are generally not viewed as spaces for the 
expression of community resistance. In the 
terse words of one officer, “these spaces … are 
spaces for dialogue”. On the whole, as we found 
in Athens, civil society actors who advance 
anti-austerity politics choose not to engage in 
the formal structures of citizen dialogue across 
the city, especially in relation to the crisis of 
available and affordable housing. Indeed, these 
actors see little strategic value in investing in 
such arenas: “Because we have a very militant 
position, they do not want to see us everywhere. 
There is … a roadblock … We always have this 
dialogue where they (the city council) do not 
want to hear certain things. So (the dialogue) 
becomes completely stuck in these meetings”. 
At the same time, elected representatives 
and policymakers question the legitimacy, 
and ‘political’ motives of critical actors. As 
one policy actor explains: “you know the 
people… (and) unfortunately behind (them), 
there is often a political party or a political 
opinion or ideologies… So the guy says ‘I’m 
a citizen’, but in fact behind (him) there is 
also a political party that expresses itself…”. 
 
 
Alternatives, Logics and Challenges 
Such judgements bring out the messiness of 
practices of participation, co-production and the 
politics of urban collaboration around Nantes’ 
multiple crises. They draw a contrast between 
the top-down governance of coproduction 
and the capacity of communities to challenge 
dominant policy framings and transform such 
arenas. Key actors repeatedly argued that there 
are no neat readings of participatory initiatives 
in Nantes, for “each time that you put a debate 
into the public arena, there are always those 
people who seize it and manage to construct 
some counter-power.” Forms of resistance are 
deemed to be part and parcel of the governance 
of participatory forums across the city. 
But, arguably, parallel forms of “dialogue” 
appear to be one of the defining contradictions 
of the Nantes model and the idiosyncrasies 
of urban governance “à la Nantaise”. As if 
to sum up these knotty problems, one of our 
respondents argued resolutely that while 
community participation across Nantes could 
not be dismissed as “mere communication” 
and “display” - it was not “just illusion or 
propaganda!”. He was, however, quick to 
add, however, that this did not mean that it 
had “the value of an exemplar, as it is often 
said.” At least for this respondent, the truth 
sat somewhere in the ‘messy’ middle. 
In recognition of messiness, we point to the risks 
that commitments to collaborative governance 
fail adequately to incorporate grievances 
and demands against social exclusion – or 
“décrochage” - into the dominant discourse of 
the economic growth coalition in Nantes. As one 
officer points out, delivering on commitments 
to become an “inclusive city” requires that the 
interpretation of, and approach to, “décrochage” 
has to move beyond the aspiration of deprived 
neighbourhoods merely ‘catching up’. In this 
view, ‘décrochage’ is ‘not solely about following 
a logic of repair’, but requires a more radical 
transformation of social relations. In other words, 
as another officer pointed out, there has to be 
a more consistent attempt to refashion politics 
and local empowerment. This refashioning has 
to find a path between input and output politics 
- the voice of communities and the capacity of 
politicians to forge temporary settlements - while 
finding points of engagement between what are 
in practice parallel systems of politics. In short, 
then, it needs to reach out to the margins of 
excluded communities and negotiate different 
spaces and “ethoi” (ethos) of engagement.
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